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KIERKEGAARD'S LYRIC OF FAITH: A LOOK AT 
FEAR AND TREMBLING" 
P ROBABLY no book of Kierkegaard has been so widely read and so universally misunderstood as Fear and 
T7qembling. In this paper I do not propose to enter into con- 
troversy with the existing interpretations of the book. I shall 
offer my own reading in the hope that it will show itself 
faithful to the letter and spirit of Kierkegaard's text. To those 
conversant with Kierkegaard scholarship, my differences 
from his other interpreters and the grounds of these differ- 
ences should be evident from the following discussion. 
Fear and T~embling is about faith. More specifically it is 
about Father Abraham and the Old Testament story of his 
near-sacrifice of Isaac. Kierkegaard is not interested in the 
historicaI and critical questions that might be raised by an 
exegesis of this text, He is conceined solely with the figure 
of Abraham, whom he regards as a paradigm for the life of 
faith. I-fe allows his pseudonym, the poet John of Silence, to 
accept the data of the Abraham story as set down in the 
book of Genesis, and to extrapolate the meaning of faith 
lyrically and problematically from the given account. 
In  the career of Abraham, Kierkegaard discovers two 
movements, which he calls the movement of infinite resigna- 
tion and the movement of faith. In obedience to God's com- 
mand Abraham is prepared to sacrifice Isaac: this is his infi- 
nite resignation. By giving up Isaac he gives up the meaning 
and content of his own temporal existence for the sake of his 
relationship to God. But even while he climbs Mt. Moriah 
and draws the knife, Abraham also believes that God will 
restore Isaac to him in time: this is his faith, by which he re- 
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covers his own life with its finite hope and its finite joy. 
Kierkegaard assumes that Abraham's infinite resignation 
is humanly intelligible, and I think we may agree with him. 
We know what men will sacrifice lor love. What might a man 
not sacrifice for the love of God? But Abraham's faith, 
Kieskegaard insists, is essentially absurd. To know that Isaac 
must be given up in time and yet to believe that he will be 
restored in time is a contradiction no logic can resolve. Again 
we may agree: this faith is absurd. 
Nevertheless John of Silence praises the life of faith. The 
obvious question is, Why? What other than madness could 
motivate such an absurd belief? John of Silence describes 
Abraham's faith as a '%umble ~ourage."~ But is it really 
humility and courage? Is it not rather presumption or des- 
pair? This is the question I shall try to answer, and by 
answering it try to make explicit what Kierkegaard means by 
faith. 
In the spirit of Kierkegaard's poet I shall begin with a 
panegyric of my own-a sympathetic delineation of Abra- 
ham's predicament-and then go on to suggest some proble- 
matic conclusions. 
"And God tempted Abraham and said unto him, Take 
Isaac, thine only son, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the 
land of Moriah, and offer him there for a burnt offering upon 
the mountain which I will show thee" (Genesis 22: 1-2). 
The command must have paralyzed Abraham. Was not 
Isaac the son of the covenant, born to Sarah in her old age, 
when it had ceased to be with her after the manner of 
women? Was he not the son of the promise by the faithful- 
ness of God? 
And now the same God by whose faithfulness Sarah had 
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conceived and borne a son commands : Take Isaac, thine only 
son (what that 'only' must have meant to Abraham!), whom 
thou lovest (can we imagine how Abraham loved Isaac?), and 
sacrifice him. 
What can Abraham do? Tortured by the contsadiction, he 
can curse God. He can hold up his life, with its tragedy, 
as an irrefutable protest against God and God's world. This 
we can certainly understand if we can understand a nlan 
like Ivan Karamazov. We can understand that a man might 
so defy God, and there is no small heroism in the defiance. 
But there is aIso (as in Ivan's case) unrelieved misery and 
perdition. What is it to be damned if not to be without God 
in the world, and therefore to live without joy or light or 
even hope? 
Abraham can cling to the covenant, of which the living 
presence of Isaac is the fulfilment. He can refuse the com- 
mand to sacrifice Isaac, and by insisting on his possession of 
him, refuse to let God play Indian-giver. I think we might 
understand this very easily. Who would not choose to keep 
what he had-the s in  that had been given him+ather than 
stake everything on the decrees of an inconstant God? Why 
give up the good one has-for nothing. For the command to 
sacrifice Isaac carries no promise of reward: if  you sacrifice 
Isaac, I wiII give you. . . : I t  is a blunt and unqualified 
command. 
Let us suppose Abraham decides to keep his son. Does he 
really possess Isaac? Can he escape the realization that he 
has kept Isaac in despite of the command of God and that his 
possession of Isaac is unlawful? Can he avoid the knowledge 
that he is a bastard father? Isaac is the son of the promise, 
the faithful fulfiIment of God's covenant. But the Isaac that 
Abraham might keep in the face of God's 'NO' is the son of 
defiance, the fruit of Abraham's self-will. He is not the son 
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'whom thou lovest" because he was giuen; he is the son of 
rebelIion whom Abraham has taken. 
Can Abraham possess Isaac on these terms? Can he enjoy 
the possession of this stolen son? If he keeps Isaac, is he not 
a desperate and defiant and damned old man, who will have 
what he wants at any cost, even the cost of making himself 
godless? 
There is a third possibility. Abraham can sacrifice Isaac in 
obedience to the command, but conclude that God is a liar, 
a monster who seems to fulfill his promises only to withdraw 
them again, a Caliban whose sport is to torture men. He 
might sacrifice Isaac, renounce everything, and in so doing 
lose his trust in God. If he rejects the God of the covenant, he 
returns from Mt. Moriah without his son, without God, with- 
out hope or joy. In giving up Isaac he has given up that re- 
lationship to God on which his life was built, and which con- 
stituted its inner meaning. 
Are there any alternatives left to Abraham? Is there any 
way for him to get off this contradiction on which he  is 
racked, whole and undefeated? Has he any choice except the 
despair of having defied God or the despair of having for- 
saken God? We would not belittle the mall who chooses de- 
fiance or hopelessness. There are times when defiance and 
despair are humanly speaking the only possibilities left to a 
man. Perhaps very few men can even bring tl.iemselves to 
this point. 
There is one possibility yet open, not strictly a human pos- 
sibility, not even Abraham's possibility except in a peculiar 
sense. It is the possibility of faith. 
In  this context faith cannot mean the assent of Abrallam's 
mind to the nonsense that he can have his cake and eat it, 
kill Isaac and keep Isaac. Abraham is no fool, and he is not 
playing with logical puzzles. He is a sober man, and we are 
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obliged to assume that no sober man could even propose 
such foolishness to himself, much less believe it. 
Abraham's faith, in this situation, can only mean: his faith- 
fulness t o  t7ae faithfulness of GodA2 He accepts both the cove- 
nant that gave him Isaac and the command that deprives 
him of Issac, trusting that what God had promised He would 
yet fulfill even though He first took away all He had hitherto 
given. Abraham believes that God is faithful. He does not 
affirm the covenant by denying the command, nor does he 
honor the command by relinquishing the covenant. His faith 
is that God is faithful both in covenant and in command, that 
God who requires all will Himself provide all that He re- 
quires. 
Yet this does not mean that he proposes this absurdity to 
himself as something he must believe. Because he is a man, 
Abraham cannot decide to believe what crucifies his under- 
standing. 
How can he then be faithful? By enduring the conflict in 
which his life is torn? No, for endurance is a form of defiance. 
Endurance means: whatever you send me, God, I can take it. 
Does he joyfully surmozlnt his problem? No, for he is not 
greater than his own life which is threatened, and to pre- 
sume to surmount this problem would again be defiance. 
Can he continue to believe in God in spite of the absurdity 
and the contradiction? No, this is again defiance. To believe 
in God in spite of everything is the most extreme form of 
defiance. If a man wills to believe in God in spite of what 
God does to him, then he has rejected God. 
The fact is that in human (reasonable and ethical) terms, 
Abraham does nothing at all. He is great, Kierkegaard says, 
by reason of his power which is impotence, great by reason 
of his wisdom which is foolishness, great by reason of his 
hope which is madness, great by reason of his love which is 
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hatred of himself (p. 31). Abraham cannot will the absurdity 
in whose strength ("by virtue of" which) he is saved and 
Isaac restored (pp. 46-64 pnssinz). He cannot resolve to  ac- 
cept the contradiction; he cannot hope against what he 
knows. In this crisis he does not draw from himself any re- 
sources at all, for he is emptied of all strength and reason and 
hope by the absurdity of his situation. All that Abraham can 
do-the only thing that is not defiant-is to receive and to 
obey. In receiving what God bestows and in obeying what 
God demands, he receives the strength to endure and the 
freedom to rejoice. This is not defiance, because in so en- 
cluring and rejoicing he does not rely on himself. "He who 
loves God wi tho~~t  faith reflects upon himself, he who loves 
God believingly reflects upon God" (p. 47). As over against 
God there is nothing a man can do but receive and obey. 
Yet it seems that Abraham has avoided defiance at the 
cost of folfeiting his humanity, To receive what God gives 
and to perform what God requires: is this not a betrayal of 
human intelligence, human will, and human dignity? Is it 
not the summation of all the stupidity, all the submissiveness, 
and all the weakness of which we think when we speak with 
justifiable contempt of "blind faith"? Is Abraham's faith blind 
and therefore despicable? 
I t  would be, Kierkegaard says, except for one thing: Abra- 
ham loves Isaac (pp. 42 ff.). In his obedience to the command 
he is not blind; he knows what he is doing. T/Vhen he draws 
the knife he does not cease to love Isaac as a father loves his 
son. I t  is no sacrifice that a slave regards himself as worthless 
and gives his life for his master. That is blind obedience. He 
gave nothing because he did not love what he gave. Since he 
did not love himself, he was nothing and therefore had 
nothing to give. Sacrifice is always clear-sighted. Abraham 
does not refuse to sacrifice Isaac because he loves him. 
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Neither does he love him less because he has to sacrifice him, 
The same is true when he receives Isaac again: if he did not 
love Isaac, he would have no joy in the receiving. Blind faith 
is meaningless because it is inhuman. But Abraham is a man, 
he does everything humanly possibIe, he loves Isaac as his 
own life. 
Yet confronted with the impossibility of keeping Isaac, he 
gives him up. He resigns what he loves in obedience to what 
he cannot understand b~zt cannot reject, and he receives 
again what he loves by the power of the absurd, a power he 
cannot comprehend but only believe. That it is better to give 
than to receive, Kierkegaard says, is the lesser mystely. The 
greater mystery, the mystery of faith, is that "it is far more 
difficult to receive than to give-that is, if one has had cour- 
age to do without and in the hour of need did not become 
cowardly" (p. 113). Abraham's faithfulness-his obedience to 
God's command and his reception of God's gift-is no blind 
subservience. I t  is the courageous suffering ancl the humble 
joy of a man who has fulfilled and exllausted his h~~manity. It 
is not the defiance of a man who will use his freedom-a 
freedom he  has even against God-to damn himself. I t  is not 
the servility of a man who will not even be a man, and so 
being nothing to himself is nothing before God. Defiance 
and servility are only the counterfeits of Abraham's faith, 
that diaIectica1 passion of humble courage, whose passion 
and whose dialectic I have here tried to trace. 
"And God tempted Abraham and said unto him, Take 
Isaac, thine only son, whom thou lovest, and get thee into 
the land of Moriah, and offer him there for a burnt offering 
upon the mountain which I will show thee." 
Abraham is subjected to a trial. Of course he does not 
know it is a test of his faith. If he knows this, it is not a trial, 
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but a competition, an endurance contest between Abraham 
and God. 
Lilce Job, Abraham has a case at law with God. And like 
Job, whom Kierkegaard discusses in Repetition, Abraham 
wins his case by the very fact that he loses it.3 For he loses 
against God. Woe to the man, Kierkegaard says, who wins 
against God. Abraham has the strength not to be strong at 
that point where strength is weakness and weakness strength. 
He strives with God and overcomes God by his impotence 
(p. 31). For the faithfulness of God conquers even Abraham's 
will (which is a real human will) and grants what Abraham 
by himself cannot attain: Isaac, Abraham's life, Abraham 
himself. What he once received as a gift, now through his 
faith he receives again. 
Kierkegaard describes faith as the "new immediacy." I t  is 
Abraham's receiving again what he was once given, what 
was his sole desire, and what he has had to give up. I t  is not 
that God requires Abraham to believe an absurdity, so that 
we must ask, Why would any man want to believe this? 
Abraham is in faith permitted by the power of the absurd to 
believe what he must with all his passion want to believe if 
only he may. The miracle of faith is that a man may believe 
that with God all things are possible, even that impossible 
thing he himself wants. 
- 
Perhaps we can now understand this statement: 
Faith is precisely this paradox, that the individual as the 
particular is higher than the universal, is justified over against 
it, is not subordinate but superior-yet in such a way, be it 
observed, that it is the particular individual who, after he 
has been subordinated as the particular to the universal, now 
through the universal becomes the individual who as the par- 
ticular is superior to the universal, for the fact that the indi- 
vidual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the 
absolute. (p. 66) 
Abraham was subordinate to the universal: he loved his son 
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and was a righteous man. He was subordinate to the univer- 
sal until it broke against the command of God. I t  is only 
through his constancy in the universal that he comes to this 
point at which he stands alone before God and is justified be- 
cause he is strong enough to be weak before God, wise 
enough to be foolish before God. He is justified by God (the 
absolute), as himself (the particular), over against himself 
(the universal). Through the universal Ab~aham becomes the 
individual justified by God over against the universal. 
This is the situation of Abraham, as sympathetically as I 
can present it, and I hope true to Kierkegaard's own presen- 
tation. For Kierkegaard, Abraham is the type of the man of 
faith, the paradigm according to which all the cases of faith 
are to be declined. 
But this immediately suggests the question, Why? Why is 
Abraham the "father of faith"? What is the universal human 
meaning of this story? On the basis of our consideration of 
Abraham, can we say anything about the relevance of faith 
to the Life of every man who is not Abraham and not sub- 
jected to Abraham's trial? 
I shall suggest Kierkegaard's answer to this question in my 
"problemata," which are the substance of the next and final 
section of this paper. 
Abraham's faith as I have described it above is structured 
by a dialectic of human possibility. This dialectic is itself the 
structure of those "stages on life's way" which in Kierkegaard's 
thought are the moments in the process of existential self- 
questioning, self-assertion, and self-discovery. In Abraham's 
case we have: immediacy (Isaac is given to Abraham and 
Sarah in their old age), the ethical (Abraham fulfills his 
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father's duty), and the religious (in resignation he sacrifices 
Isaac and by faith receives him again). 
What follows cannot be a complete account of the stages 
on life's way, but only a brief sketch of the dialectic of hu- 
man possibility, designed to show the parallel between Abra- 
ham's case and the case of every man. 
Eveiy man is by nature an object of concern to himself. 
If he is not self-concerned, he is no man. Every man is con- 
cerned to know and to actualize his peculiar human possi- 
bilities. 
At first it seems that all things are possible. Whatever I 
desire I can secure for myself: so thinks, for example, the 
very young child. But it soon becomes clear to this (aesthetic) 
attitude that the satisfaction of desire is not guaranteed. It  
is possible that I shall get what I want, but only possible, 
and therefore irnpo~sible.~ Perhaps my desires will be ful- 
filled, but it does not depend on me and my doing. The pos- 
sibility that my wishes will be granted is not my possibility 
but my fate, In reality the fseedom of the life of immediacy 
is a sti£ling fatalism, born of the knowledge that frustration 
is as likely as fulfilment and that nothing can be done to 
avert it. The certainty and finality and untimeliness of death 
is enough in itself to drain immediate existence of its pos- 
sibilities and its freedom. 
Is there any escape into freedom out of the reign of for- 
tune? Fortune and misfortune are the lords of nature, of that 
world which the man of immediacy regards as the real world. 
To escape their sway he must escape the world over which 
they mle. He may therefore flee to tlle realm of imagination 
and reason, to poetry and to philosophy. In poetry and in 
philosophy it  must indeed be the case that a11 things are pos- 
sible. I can think anything and imagine anything; imagina- 
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tively and speculatively I can enjoy all possibilities indiscrim- 
inately. 
But in losing reality the poet and the intellectual lose pos- 
sibility as well. The fancies of poetry and speculation are 
only possibilities; enjoyed for their own sake, they are day- 
dreams. Because they are the products of a retreat from 
reality, they cannot be realized, and so they are not real 
possibilities. The possibilities I only think and fancy to my- 
self are not my possibilities, just because I have them only 
in fancy and in tl~ougl~t.  The poet and the speculative philos- 
opher are melancholies. They live a life that is cut adrift from 
the world, sailing forever like the flying DutcIlman on a sea 
of mere po~sibilities.~ 
Thus, following Kierkegaard, a life whicl~ is immersed in 
nature (living out of natural impulse) and a life which is in 
perpetual flight from natural exigence are equally impossible. 
They run dialectically into the same impasse: both are de- 
structive of the real possibilities of human life. The aesthetic 
mode of existence results finally in a corrosion of individual- 
ity and a dissolution of personality into blind fatalism or 
effete detachment. 
The ethical understanding of Iife seems to open a way out 
of the aesthetic impasse. The moral man thinks he can dis- 
cover his real possibilities in a Iife of fseedom made actual 
in decision. By choosing to be what I am, he thinks, by mak- 
ing my possibilities my own, I shall make my own possibili- 
ties. In freedom I create myself-not ex nihilo of course, but 
by taking as my own, and making myself responsible for, that 
life which in fact I have. Whatever I am, therefore, I am by 
my own will, for I accept and affirm myself as what I am. 
Whatever I am is my own self-chosen and self-sealized pos- 
sibility, and tllerefore my possibilities are all mine. All things 
are possible to me because I am a being who in freedom can 
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and does choose to be whatever he is and to do whatever he 
But this ethical mode of existence, Kierkegaard holds, is 
- 
also self-destructive, because it is prenlissed on a basic dis- 
honesty about what it means to be human. Ethically re- 
garded, I am an autonomous man. I acknowledge only that 
law which is prescribed by my own humanity, a i d  I require 
myself to justify by that law whatever I do. I am to be my 
own legislator, plaintiff, defendant, judge and executioner. 
But can I in fact justify myself before the law that is (au- 
tonomously) written in my heart? Kierkegaard says, No. Sup- 
pose, for example (to use Kierkegaard's own illustration), 
that I want to have a holiday in the park. Can I justify 
this cliversion ethically? Actually I cannot, for there is no 
dialectic by which I can bring this harmless and accidental 
- 
triviality into relation with my self-imposed duty. I cannot see 
in this simple recreational activity a fulfilment of that law 
by which I presume to determine myself. If I am a t  all 
honest, I cannot avoid the conclusion that I have my holiday 
just because I want to. As a human being with ordinary 
human needs and desires I cannot carry out the project of 
living ethically. 
Thus I arrive at the paradox that as a free man I cannot go 
for a holiday in the park. I cannot make it my duty to go to 
the park, or as Kierkegaard says, I cannot express the uni- 
versal in this and every particular. I am involved in a con- 
tradiction between my assumed autonomy and my recalci- 
trant humanity. As a free man I am a slave to my own free- 
dom. 
But (to continue the figure) I do go to the park in a thou- 
sand ways every day. Not only in actions that are manifest, 
but in countless invisible thoughts and subtle inclinations, 
- 
I live extraneous to my conception of mysel1 and my duty. 
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For this reason, Kierkegaard says, I must acknowledge the 
ineluctible and absolute guilt of my situation as an ethical 
man.7 
To speak of absolute guilt may seem extreme. But Kierke- 
gaard wants to say that to be human is literally to be in ex- 
tremity. To be human means, in ethical terms, to take your 
life into your own hands. By Philistine or by aesthetic stand- 
ards this is excessive. Nevertheless the ethical freedom of 
man (and therefore the basis of human equality, Kierke- 
gaard's "universal") is just this fact, that he may take his life 
into his own hands, and to do so is an extreme thing. 
The extremity in which I am, therefore, is guilt. My guilt, 
however, is not that I intermittently or even regularly fail to 
do my duty. Guilt names a contradiction implied by my very 
human self-assertion. My guilt is not that I sometimes fail; 
it is rather that I undertake at all to be my own justification 
and my own destiny. Guilt is the dishonesty of conceiving 
human existence in terms of ethical autonomy.' 
The ethical man's life expresses his conviction that all 
things are possible to freedom. But his life includes the con- 
tradiction that nothing is possible to freedom. His own life, 
with its holidays in the park, is not possible. I t  is unjustified, 
it stands outside of and is condemned by its own law. And 
the impossibility of a self-justifying human life is absolute 
guilt. 
Thus the endeavor by a human being to comprehend and 
enact his own existential possibilities, by freedom, runs like 
the aesthetic life into a dead end. No particular theory of 
ethics is in question here; rather, the assumption of freedom 
necessary to any ethical self-understanding is self-contradic- 
tory. Guilt is the explicit existential predicament in which 
the self-annihilating consequences of ethical freedom are 
made manifest. Guilt is just the moral situation of man as 
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such, and in guilt the impossibility of achieving selfhood by 
freedom is made actual. 
Now we have come to the essence of Abraham's stalemate. 
Isaac, whom he could not have by nature, he cannot have by 
freedom. He cannot give Isaac to himself by freedom, as 
Isaac was not his by nature in the first place. And Isaac is 
Abraham's own life. Isaac is lost. 
But at this point-and this is the one point Kierkegaard 
wanted to make-comes the command to give up Isaac. 
In what form, generally, does this command come, and 
what does i t  mean to men in general? For Kierkegaard the 
command to give up Isaac meant the claim of ~eligion that 
only the man who loses his life shall save it. In  particular this 
is the claim of Christianity, with its doctrines of creation (irn- 
mediacy), sin (the ethical), and redemption. If Abraham 
believed by virtue of the absurd, Christianity was for Kier- 
kegaard the Absurd: the absurdity that in the aesthetic and 
ethical impotence of man, his being is first definitively and 
positively made possible, by a power which is only effective 
when it is most impossible. The Christian doctrine of re- 
demption and recreation is the impossibIe possibility, the 
offense, the contradiction and the Paradox by which alone 
health of the spirit is possible. 
Apart from theological considerations, the existential 
meaning of Christian faith is the same as that of Abraham's 
faith: the life which is not to be had by nature (aesthetic) 
and cannot be won by freedom (ethical) must be given up. 
Then and only then (you may believe this miracle) it will be 
given again to him who is at  once able to renounce it and 
happy to receive it. As Kierkegaard puts it: 
God is that all things are possible, and that a11 things are 
possible is God; and only the man whose being has been so 
shaken that he became spirit by understanding that all things 
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are possible, only he has had dealings with God. (pp. 173- 
174) 
This is a translation into reflective telms of that text of 
Paul from which the title of Kierkegaard's book is derived: 
"Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it 
is God which worlceth in you both to will and to do of his 
good pleasure" (Phil. 2: 12-13). 
Religious faith is faith in the absurdity (not demanded of 
a man, but allowed him) that with God all things are pos- 
sible, even his own life, if he will receive it as a gift after 
having given it up as his right. The relevance of the absurd- 
ity to every man is that the absurdity is the only possibility 
for human life that is not self-destructive. Faith is man's only 
possibility this side of despair. 
I t  is Kierkegaard's belief that the human situation is es- 
sentially a religious situation. And that means, a situation in 
which man confronts the absolute power and reality. This he 
does in the absoluteness of his own extremity, in that ex- 
tremity of guilt in which his self is trapped and stifled. This 
situation is religious in the sense that it leaves no alternatives 
but faith or despair. Either the recognition that the only 
possibility open to me is not my own, but the absurd power 
of God; or the annihilation of my self in defiance of this 
power. The conlmand to give up Isaac contains dialectically 
the impossible possibility of his restoration. Only the man 
who loses his life shall save it, and it is saved for him in his 
very act of giving it up. Resignation and faith therefore be- 
come two aspects of one and the same thing: the impossibil- 
ity of the self (humanly speaking) is the arena in which (di- 
vinely speaking) all things are possible. 
At this point, unfortunately, it must be said that Kier- 
kegaard was so ingenious at depicting the conflicts of faith- 
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its dread and distress, its fear and trembling-that he out- 
smarted himself. In the Postscript Kierkegaard wrote: "While 
aesthetic existence is essentially enjoyment, and ethical exist- 
ence, essentially struggle and victory, religious existence is 
essentially suffering, and that not as a transitional moment, 
but as per~isting."~ This statement bears witness to Kierke- 
gaard's own contention that subjectivity is truth,1° and that a 
man can understand no more than his life expresses.ll He 
himself was so full of Sturm und Drang, so romantically ab- 
sorbed in his own genius and the sufferings of his genius, 
that he never gave up Isaac. Pace his uncritical biographers, 
he never really relinquished Regina. He tricked himself out 
of her by trying to give her her freedom, and by presuming 
to give her her freedom, he played God with her. If I had had 
faith, I would have married Regina, he declares in a moment 
of complete consi~tency.~~ But he did not have faith, and he 
did not marry her. Because he had to be a genius (aesthetic), 
he never became a man of faith or a husband. Instead he 
made a life and a career for himself out of poising on the thin 
edge of resignation. Consequently his understanding of faith 
was always only a poetic understanding. 
On his own showing in Fear and Trembling the statement 
above should conclude: religion is suffering constantly over- 
come by joy. How else can we understand the joy of Abra- 
ham when he returns home with Isaac after his trial? But in 
the very same book Kierkegaard gives us a picture of the 
"knight of faith"-with his make-believe wife preparing a 
little make-believe supper-that is sheer self-deception, Kier- 
kegaard's own self-deception (pp. 49-51). If the argument of 
Fear and Trembling is correct, faith is not make-believe or 
irony, but the power which makes life possible. To have 
faith, Kierkegaard said, is to be out over 70,000 fathoms of 
water-and to be glad. But when he himself ventured out on 
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the deeps, he was like St. Peter walking on the water: he 
couldn't help wondering how he did it, and so he sank. 
This was Kierkegaard's personal problem, but it reflects 
and is reflected in his discussions of faith, which build up to 
the point of indicating the relevance and the meaning of the 
absurdity-but then tend to dissipate in arch, ironic, or 
merely clever delineations of the life of faith, or else to re- 
main in uneasy equilibrium at the point of resignation, CUT- 
tivating for its own sake the fear and trembling of the reli- 
gious crisis. Sometimes the books, like the man, succumb to 
the demonic temptation, always at hand in the religious life, 
to confuse oneself with God. The concrete delineation of the 
meaning of faith, of the very worldly sense in which human 
life is possible if it is lived by the power of the absurd: this 
is what Kierkegaard cannot consistently supply. 
The purpose of this paper has been to describe the nature 
of faith and the relevance of faith as Kierkegaard sees them. 
All I would here claim for Kierkegaard is that he does define 
the dialectic of human existence by which, in which, and to 
which alone the claim of religion is meaningful. And in a 
formal way he has understood the situation of the religious 
man, the man who lives by virtue of the absurd, by a power 
which is not his own and which he cannot understand, but 
which he also cannot refuse without at the same time deny- 
ing himself. The joy of this situation, the substance of that 
life which a man has at the hands of God, is something which 
Kierkegaard, like his poet John of Silence, could only marvel 
at but not comprehend. 
Lours H. MACREY 
NOTES 
1. S9ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto 
Death, Garden City, 1954, p. 59. This paperback is a revision 
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and correction of the hardcover edition. All further references to 
Fear and T~embling in this edition will be set in parentheses in 
the text. 
2. This phrase has echoes of Karl Barth's The  Epistle to the Romans, 
but nothing of Barth's meaning is here implied. 
3. Cf. Kierkegaard, Repetition, Princeton, 1946, esp. pp. 110-113, 
121-134, 149-159. 
4. Cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Princeton, 
1944, pp. 121-122. 
5. Cf. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Garden City, 1959, Vol. I, "Diapsal- 
mata" et passim, and Vol. 11, "Equilibrium." Cf. also Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Bk, Two, Pt. Two, Ch. 111. 
6. Cf. Either/Or, Vol. 11, loc. cit. 
7. For Kierkegaard's elaborate and mastelful "Deer Park" parable, 
see Concluding Unscientific Postsc~ipt, pp. 422-446. 
8. Cf. inter alia Either/Or, Vol. 11, "Ultimatum," and the discourse 
Purity of Heart, New York, 1938, pass in^. 
9. Concluding Utzscietztific Postscript, p. 256. 
10. Ibid., Bk. Two, Pt. Two, Ch. 11. 
11. Alexander Dru, The Journab of S ~ r e n  Kierkegaard, London, 1938, 
No. 870. 
12. Cf, ibid., No. 444, No. 367. 
